A REPLY TO Mr. *Clark*'s Defence Of his LETTER to Mr. *DODWELL*. WITH A POSTSCRIPT relating to Mr. *Milles*'s Anſwer to Mr. *Dodwell*'s Epiſtolary Diſcourſe.

By Anthony Collins.

The Second Edition Corrected.

——*Jeſus Chriſt, who hath aboliſh'd Death, and hath brought Life and Immortality to Life thro the Goſpel*, 2 Tim. 1. 10.

M. Evolve igitur librum Platonis qui eſt de animo: amplius quod deſideres, nihil erit.

A. Feci mehercule & quidem ſæpius, ſed neſcio quomodo dum lego, aſſentior: cum poſui librum & mecum ipſe de immortalitate animorum, cepi cogitare aſſenſio omnis illa elabitur.

M. T. Ciceronis Tuſcularum Quæſtionum lib. 1.

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A REPLY *to Mr.* Clark's *Defence of his Letter to Mr.* Dodwell.

THE Importance of the *Queſtion concerning the Poſſibility of Matter's thinking*, and the Ability of Mr. *Clark* to urge to the beſt advantage, whatever can be ſaid on that ſide of it which he eſpouſes, make me preſume it will not be unacceptable to the impartial Reader, to ſee what Anſwer can be given to his *Defence of an Argument, made uſe of in a Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, *to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul*, by the Author of the Objections to that *Argument*; who ſtill thinks it inconcluſive, and propoſes to ſhow its inconcluſiveneſs in the following Papers, and thereby to contribute towards the Eſtabliſhment of the Immortality of Man on that Evidence only that God has thought fit to afford us of it; and by a *new Inſtance* aſſert the Freedom and Liberty, ſo peculiar to the Country wherein we live, of examining the Grounds and Reaſons of prevailing O-

pinions. But if he happens to fail in the Execution of his Deſign, either thro the Weakneſs of his Cauſe, or his own Inability to deal with ſo learned an Adverſary ; yet he is very ſure not to err in any thing but a matter of Speculation. He is not diſpos'd to uſe any foreign or unmannerly Mixture in any Debate, much leſs when engag'd with a Gentleman, who by confining himſelf ſolely to the Argument, ſets ſo unuſual an Example of fair dealing in Controverſy.

The Argument made uſe of by Mr. *Clark*, to prove the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul, was, *That the Soul cannot poſſibly be material, is demonſtrable from the ſingle Conſideration even of bare Senſe and Conſciouſneſs it ſelf : for Matter being a diviſible Subſtance, conſiſting always of ſeparable, nay of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts ; 'tis plain, unleſs it were eſſentially conſcious, in which caſe every Particle of Matter muſt conſiſt of innumerable Conſciouſneſſes, no Syſtem of it, in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion, can be an Individual Conſcious Being. For ſuppoſe three or three hundred Particles of Matter at a Mile or any given diſtance one from another, is it poſſible that all thoſe ſeparate parts ſhould in that State be one individual conſcious Being ? Suppoſe then all theſe Particles be brought together into one Syſtem,* ſo

Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, p. 33.

ſo as to touch one another; Will they thereby, or by any Motion or Compoſition whatſoever, become any whit leſs truly diſtinct Beings, than they were at the greateſt diſtance? how then can their being diſpos'd in any poſſible Syſtem, make them one individual conſcious Being? If you ſuppoſe God by his Infinite Power ſuperadding Conſciouſneſs to the united Particles; yet ſtill thoſe Particles being really and neceſſarily as diſtinct Beings as ever, cannot be themſelves the Subject in which that individual Conſciouſneſs inheres; but the Conſciouſneſs can only be ſuperadded by the addition of ſomething, which in all the Particles muſt ſtill it ſelf be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whoſe Power of thinking is undeniably one individual Conſciouſneſs, cannot poſſibly be a material Subſtance.

Againſt this Argument I offer'd ſeveral Objections, which I ſhall repeat and defend, in the ſame Order that Mr. *Clark* has thought fit to conſider them. The firſt is as follows.

" 1. Let us ſuppoſe, with Mr. *Clark*, " that a material Subſtance in any man- " ner diſpos'd, is not an individual Be- " ing; yet I cannot ſee, but that an indi- " vidual Power may reſide in a material " Syſtem, which conſiſts of actually ſe- " parate and diſtinct Parts; and conſe- " quently that an individual Being is not

" indiſpenſably neceſſary to be the ſubject
" of an individual Power. Now if an
" individual Power can be lodg'd by God
" in, or ſuperadded to that which is not
" an individual Being, or follows from
" the Compoſition or Modification of a
" material Syſtem, conſiſting of actually
" ſeparate and diſtinct Particles; the ve-
" ry Soul and Strength of Mr. *Clark*'s
" Demonſtration is gone. And Matter of
" Fact is ſo plain and obvious, that a
" Man cannot turn his Eye, but he will
" meet with material Syſtems, wherein
" there are individual Powers, which are
" not in every one, nor in any one of the
" Particles that compoſe them, when ta-
" ken apart and conſider'd ſingly. Let
" us inſtance, for example, in a *Roſe, that*
" conſiſts of ſeveral Particles, which ſe-
" parately and ſingly want a Power to
" produce that agreeable Senſation we
" experience in them when united. And
" therefore either each of the Particles in
" that Union contributes to the individual
" Power, which is the external Cauſe of
" our Senſation; or elſe God Almighty
" ſuperadds the Power of producing that
" Senſation in us, upon the Union of the
" Particles: and this, for ought I can ſee,
" may be the caſe of Matter's thinking.
" Thoſe Particles which compoſe the
" Brain, may under that Modification
" either

" either have the Power of thinking ne-
" ceſſarily flowing from them, or elſe
" may have the Power of thinking ſuper-
" added to them by the Power of God,
" tho ſingly and ſeparately they may not
" have the Power of thinking. The
" Fallacy of Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, by
" which as I take it he deceives himſelf,
" lies in this, that by an individual Pow-
" er he underſtands a Power which can
" only proceed from or reſide in an indi-
" vidual Being; which is a plain begging
" of the Queſtion, or ſuppoſing the thing
" in diſpute, that *Thinking is ſuch an in-*
" *dividual Power:* to prove which he has
" not, tho all he ſays depends on it, of-
" fer'd ſo much as one word, and I con-
" ceive cannot, till he is perfectly ac-
" quainted with the nature of Thinking.
" I readily acknowledg, that we can
" diſtinguiſh the various Modes of think-
" ing from one another; but whether
" Thinking is ſuch a kind of Operation as
" proceeds from an Individual Being, or
" whether it proceeds from a Being which
" conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct
" Parts, I muſt be content to be ignorant
" till ſome better proof is produc'd to
" place it in an Individual Being, than by
" calling it an Individual Power.

To anſwer this Objection Mr. *Clark* ſays, Pag. 9.
That all Powers and Qualitys may be diſtin-

guiſh'd into three ſorts. 1. Some Qualitys there are which do, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, inhere in the Subſtance to which they are aſcrib'd. And concerning theſe it is evident, that every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syſtem of Matter, is nothing elſe than the Sum or Aggregate of ſo many Powers or Qualitys of the ſame kind inherent in all the Parts. The Magnitude of any Body is nothing elſe but the Sum of the Magnitudes of all its Parts: Its Motion is nothing elſe but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if Cogitation in like manner could poſſibly be a Quality, really inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt likewiſe neceſſarily be the Sum and Reſult of the Cogitations of the ſeveral Parts, and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there are Particles of Matter. 2. Other Powers, which are vulgarly look'd on as Individual Powers, reſulting from and reſiding in the whole Syſtem, without reſiding particularly in each or any of its ſingle and original Parts; ſuch as the Sweetneſs of certain Bodys, their Colours, &c. but this is only a groſs and vulgar Error. 3. Other Powers, ſuch as Magnetiſm and Electrical Attractions, are not real Qualitys at all reſiding in any Subject, but merely abſtract Names, to expreſs the Effects of ſome determinate Motions of certain Streams of Matter: And Gravitation

tion it ſelf is not a Quality inhering in Matter, or that can poſſibly reſult from any Texture or Compoſition, but only an Effect of the continual and regular Operation of ſome other Being upon it, by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under theſe three Heads muſt neceſſarily be contain'd all poſſible Qualitys, Modes or Powers whatſoever: And now the Queſtion is among which of theſe three ſorts of Powers muſt Conſciouſneſs or Thinking be reckon'd. I ſuppoſe it will neither be ſaid to be a mere abſtract Name, nor yet an Effect produc'd in or upon a foreign Subſtance (as the Sweetneſs and Colour of a Roſe is not any individual Power in the Roſe it ſelf, but merely a Senſation excited in him that ſmells or ſees it) but that it is a Quality or Power truly and really inhering in the thinking Subſtance it ſelf. And therefore if that thinking Subſtance be a Syſtem of Matter, the former Reaſoning holds ſtrictly and demonſtratively true, that the Conſciouſneſs muſt inhere in all and every one of the Particles of that Syſtem taken ſingly as well as together. To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind ariſing from or belonging to the ſeveral Parts of which the Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction: 'Tis ſuppoſing either an Univerſal to exiſt without Particulars, or an Effect to be produc'd without a Cauſe; or that a Quality is, by the Power of God, made ſo to ariſe out of nothing,

thing, as to be ſuperadded to a Subject, and to ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject to which it is at the ſame time ſuppos'd to belong.

1. Before I make any return to this Anſwer of Mr. *Clark*, it will not be improper to fix and determine the preciſe Significations of ſome Words on which the Queſtion turns. The Queſtion being, Whether a Syſtem of Matter can have a Power of Thinking, or an individual Conſciouſneſs ſuperadded to it, or flow from any Modification of that Syſtem; it is evident, that by a *Power of thinking* is underſtood, not a *Capacity to think*, but *actual Thinking*, for elſe *Conſciouſneſs* could not be properly employ'd, by Mr. *Clark*, to ſignify the ſame thing with a *Power of Thinking*.

2. The Term Individual, when apply'd to Power, muſt likewiſe ſignify barely *One Power* without any Determination; whether that *Power* proceed from an individual or an actually divided or diviſible Being: for if an *individual Power* ſignifies a Power which proceeds from or inheres in an individual Being, and Conſciouſneſs be ſuppos'd ſuch an individual Power, and the Queſtion is, Whether Conſciouſneſs or any individual Power can reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, or a Being that is not individual; there is no ground to diſpute, whether a Syſtem of Matter can have Conſciouſneſs, or any other individual Power,

Power, on ſuch Suppoſitions. It is evident, that on thoſe Suppoſitions a Syſtem of Matter cannot poſſibly think; for a Syſtem of Matter being ſuppos'd to conſiſt of Parts and Thinking, or Conſciouſneſs being ſuppos'd to be a Power incapable of reſiding in a Being that conſiſts of Parts, the Queſtion of Matter's thinking will amount to this, *Whether that which cannot think, can think.* I do not, by what I have ſaid, exclude Mr. *Clark* from contending for Conſciouſneſs or Thinking's being a Power that can only reſide in an individual Being. He is at his liberty to make that a Queſtion whenever he thinks fit, and I ſhall be very glad to ſee what ſo able a Gentleman can ſay to give me light into the Nature of Thinking. But all that I contend for is, that Thinking be not ſuppos'd an individual Power, in a Senſe that begs the Queſtion between us, till it be prov'd individual in that ſenſe; and then I will allow, that there is no ground to diſpute whether a Syſtem can think. Theſe things being clear'd, I anſwer to Mr. *Clark*'s Argument:

1. That it is nothing elſe but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.* For by enumerating his three ſorts of Powers or Qualitys of Matter, and ſhowing that the two laſt of the ſorts are improperly call'd Powers or Qualitys, he does ſuppoſe that

a Syſtem of Matter has, and can have only Powers of one ſort or kind, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; which, what is it elſe but to argue, That becauſe we know of no other Powers of a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it has and can have no other Powers of a different kind from Magnitude and Motion? Whereas he ought to have demonſtrated, if he would have prov'd the Point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; and then there might have been ſome ground to conclude, *That if Conſciouſneſs be really inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt be the Sum or Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts:* for till it is demonſtrated, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind, it may as well be ſuppos'd, that there are Powers of different kinds in different Particles of Matter, or that God can ſuperadd different kinds of Powers to the different Parts of a material Syſtem; and then the Action or Power exerted, reſulting from them when united, will be of a different ſort or ſpecies from any Power inhering in the Particles

ticles ſingly conſider'd, and ſo far from being the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind, that the new Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of a different kind. And if ſo, then Mr. *Clark* muſt prove, that Conſciouſneſs is not an Action or actual Power reſulting from an Union of different kinds of Powers, or elſe he will not be able to prove the Impoſſibility of Matter's thinking from its Diviſibility, or its being actually divided *in infinitum*; for on ſuppoſition that there are Powers of different kinds in different parts of the ſame material Syſtem, and that Conſciouſneſs cannot be prov'd to be, properly ſpeaking, an Individual Power, or a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being, there will be no reaſon to conclude, *That if Conſciouſneſs be really inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt be the Sum or Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts:* but the contrary, That if Conſciouſneſs does inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt not be the Sum or Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and all Mr. *Clark*'s Difficultys, founded on Matter's conſiſting of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, will be remov'd; for it will then be no *Contradiction to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter, without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole conſiſts*, no more than it will be to conceive

conceive that a Whole is not the ſame with a Piece of a Clock: for the Power reſulting from the different contributing Powers in the Syſtem, neither belongs to any part of the Syſtem when conſider'd by it ſelf, nor is it of the ſame ſort or kind with any Power in any part of the Syſtem, nor will there be any ground to *ſuppoſe an Univerſal to exiſt without Particulars*, but a particular Power exiſting to which ſeveral particular Powers contribute, as every Man is a particular Man, tho various Powers are neceſſary to conſtitute him of the Species: nor, laſtly, to *ſuppoſe an Effect produc'd without a Cauſe*; for the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, are the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of that Power which did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſider'd. And thus it may be conceiv'd, that there may be a Power in all thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain, to contribute to the Act of Thinking, before they are united under that Form; tho while they are diſunited, they have no more of Conſciouſneſs than any Being which produces Sweetneſs in us (that is made up of Parts wherein different Powers inhere) when under a particular Form, has a power to produce Sweetneſs in us, when its Parts are diſunited and ſeparated.

2. Tho

2. Tho I have ſuppos'd different Parts of Matter, in the ſame Syſtem, to have actual Powers eſſentially different; yet I will allow that Matter is every where under the ſame Circumſtances, endow'd with the ſame Powers; and that, taking the whole material World together, every Particle thereof is capable of contributing to all the actual Powers of Matter equally with any other Particle whatever. But then if theſe actual Powers exiſt but only under ſuch and ſuch Regulations, and that a Diſpoſition of Parts by Motion be neceſſary to the Exertion of every Power, it will equally follow, that the Power of every Syſtem will not be the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind, but be the Sum of Powers of different kinds; becauſe by the different Situation of Parts in a Syſtem, a different Power is exerted in every Particle, tho each of them would exert the ſame Power under the ſame Circumſtance or Poſition. And I much rather take this to be the Caſe, than to ſuppoſe really different Powers founded on different Capacitys in the different Parts of Matter; for by Experience we ſee that every thing by change of Form becomes every thing. The ſame Parts of Matter become Parts of *Dung*, *Earth*, *Graſs*, *Corn*, *Sheep*, *Horſes*, *Men*, *&c.* and act their parts under theſe Mutations: and I would add, as what ſeems equally

equally matter of fact to me, That the Matter of which an Egg consists, doth intirely constitute the young one, and that the Action of Sensation began under a particular Disposition of the Parts by Motion, without the addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, as the Powers of Vegetation, Gravitation, of producing the Sensation of Heat, Cold, Red, Blue, Yellow, are perform'd without the addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, had not the System-makers of *Europe* thought fit to deny it, in order to etch out their Hypotheses.

3. Mr. *Clark* has not rightly enumerated the known Powers of Matter. In order to make that appear, let us consider what we mean by *Power*. By Power I understand, in the Question between us, *An actual Ability to make or receive any Change, to act or be acted on.* The Question then will be, whether there is in any System of Matter a Power to make or receive a Change, to act or be acted on, that is not the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind? Now that there are Powers in Systems of Matter, that are not the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, is apparent from this Consideration, That not only mere Magnitude and Motion is necessary to the making or receiving some sort of Change, but the particular Texture of a Being. Now the Texture,

let

let it be of the Eye, Ear, or any other part of Man, is eſſentially different from the Texture of other Beings, and the Texture of the Parts of the Being it ſelf; and it is from its Texture, as well as from its Magnitude and Motion, that the Matter of which the Eye conſiſts, has a power to make or receive a Change, to act or be acted on: which Power depends ſo intirely on the particular Texture, that upon the leaſt alteration of ſome Parts of the Eye, it ceaſes to have a power of being operated on by external Objects, or of contributing to the Act of Viſion. And if the Powers of a Syſtem of Matter may intirely ceaſe upon the leaſt Alteration of a part of that Syſtem, it is evident that the Powers of the Syſtem inhere not in its Parts in the ſame ſenſe with Magnitude and Motion: for divide and vary the Parts of Matter as much as you will, there will be Magnitude, and may be Motion; but divide or vary the leaſt part of the Eye, and the Power of contributing towards the Act of Viſion is intirely at an end.

4. I had ſaid, " That the Fallacy of " Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, by which as I " took it he deceiv'd himſelf, lies in this, " That by an Individual Power he un- " derſtands a Power which can only pro- " ceed from or reſide in an Individual Be- " ing, which is a plain begging of the

 " Queſtion,

" Queſtion, or ſuppoſing the thing in diſ-
" pute, that Thinking is ſuch an Indivi-
" dual Power. To prove which he has
" not, tho all he ſays depends on it, of-
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" ted with the nature of Thinking. I
" readily acknowledg that we can diſtin-
" guiſh the various Modes of Thinking
" from one another; but whether Think-
" ing is ſuch a kind of Operation as pro-
" ceeds from an Individual Being, or whe-
" ther it proceeds from a Being that con-
" ſiſts of Parts, I muſt be content to be ig-
" norant, till ſome better proof is produc'd
" to place it in an Individual Being, than
" by calling it an Individual Power.

To manifeſt this, and ſhow yet farther the Weakneſs of Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, I obſerve that Mr. *Clark* propos'd to demonſtrate that a Power of Thinking or Conſciouſneſs cannot inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, *from the ſingle Conſideration of bare Senſe or Conſciouſneſs it ſelf.* His Argument is in ſhort as follows: *Matter is a Subſtance conſiſting always of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; Conſciouſneſs is an Individual Power. An Individual Power cannot be added to a Subſtance, conſiſting of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, but by being added to all thoſe Parts of which that Subſtance doth conſiſt; whereby inſtead of one*

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Conſciouſneſs, there will be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there be diſtinct Parts of that Subſtance. This, if I miſtake not, comprehends the intire ſtrength of his Argument, with relation to which I ſhall lay down the following Particulars.

(1.) That our Idea, ſignify'd by the term *Matter* in this Diſpute, is of a ſolid Being, which doth conſiſt of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts.

(2.) Saying, *That Conſciouſneſs is an Individual Power* (be they ever ſo many that ſay ſo) is but calling Conſciouſneſs by another name. It is not giving an account of what Conſciouſneſs is, wherein it doth conſiſt, which is requiſite to demonſtrate from Conſciouſneſs, that Conſciouſneſs cannot be added to a Being that conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts. If a Man ſhould ſay, that Conſciouſneſs is a Quality that makes the Being to which it is added not to conſiſt of diſtinct Parts, he would (allowing the Truth of his Aſſertion) prove that it cannot inhere in a Being that conſiſts of Parts, becauſe of the obvious Repugnancy there is between the Co-exiſtence of theſe two Propertys, Affections, Qualitys (or call them as you pleaſe) in the ſame Being. But it is not enough to demonſtrate that Conſciouſneſs cannot be ſuperadded to a Being that conſiſts of Parts, to call Conſciouſneſs by ano-

ther name. If one ſhould undertake to demonſtrate to me, that Conſciouſneſs can only inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, and for this purpoſe ſhould tell me, that Conſciouſneſs is an Organical Operation, I ſhould deſire him to tell me, wherein Thinking or Conſciouſneſs doth conſiſt? for if he would do that, I ſhould be able to know whether it is an Organical Operation or not: whereas his telling me that it is an Organical Operation, leaves me as ignorant what Thinking is, in what it does conſiſt, as I was before thoſe Sounds reached in my Ear; and does as much ſuppoſe the thing in diſpute, *That Matter can only think*, as Mr. *Clark*'s calling Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power, in his ſenſe of Individual Power, is ſuppoſing that Matter cannot think.

(3.) Therefore before it can be demonſtrated from Conſciouſneſs, that Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being that conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, it muſt be demonſtrated, that Conſciouſneſs is *an Individual Power* in Mr. *Clark*'s ſenſe of thoſe words, or that it is a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being: But Mr. *Clark* has not ſaid any thing to this Queſtion, but barely by calling Conſciouſneſs *an Individual Power*. His Argument therefore, ſtript of all doubtful Expreſſions, and reſting on the Proofs by

which

which he ſupports it, is this: *Matter is a Subſtance conſiſting always of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being which conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; therefore Matter cannot think, or be conſcious.* To ſupport which Connexion he has no intermediate Ideas, but by ſaying, *Conſciouſneſs is an Individual Power, and an Individual Power cannot reſide in a Being that conſiſts of Parts; therefore Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being which conſiſts of Parts:* which carries the matter not one jot further than merely ſuppoſing Conſciouſneſs to be a Power, which can only reſide in an Individual Being.

(4.) Having made good my Charge againſt Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, as it ſtands in his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, which only could lie before me when I made my Objections, and from whence Mr. *Clark* has urg'd nothing in his Defence, to ſhow that he did not beg the Queſtion, I ſhall conſider what I can find in his *Defence*, to ſhow that Thinking is a Power which muſt reſide in an Individual Being. He ſays, *That every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syſtem of Matter, is nothing elſe but the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind, inherent in all its Parts; and if Cogitation could be a Quality really inherent in Matter, it muſt be the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral* P. 9, 10.

Parts, which is apparently abſurd. Now tho this does not ſuppoſe Thinking to be a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being, as Mr. *Clark*'s Argument did, yet it ſuppoſes another Propoſition, *That all the Powers of any Syſtem of Matter are nothing elſe but the Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind.* From whence he infers, that Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, or, which is all one, that it is an Individual Power in his ſenſe; and therefore it lies upon him to prove that there can be no Power in a Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum and Reſult of Powers of the ſame kind.

(5.) Having fully examin'd the main Argument of the firſt Article of Mr. *Clark*'s Defence, I proceed to take notice of two or three particular Incidents in it. As,

P. 8. 1. Mr. *Clark* charges me with ſaying, *Sweetneſs is in a Roſe*; whereas I ſay quite the contrary in theſe words, "That a "Roſe conſiſts of Particles, which ſingly "and ſeparately want a power to produce "that agreeable Senſation we experience "in them when united." And therefore

P. 11. Mr. *Clark* had no reaſon to ſhow the *Vulgarneſs and Groſſneſs* of believing that Sweetneſs exiſts in Bodys, to me who agreed with him, as appears by my own words. I know no one more capable of inſtructing others than Mr. *Clark*, and therefore

therefore I wiſh he had choſen ſome Topick wherein we differ'd; and then how well and cloſely ſoever he had argu'd, I ſhould have had the ſatisfaction either of ſeeing my ſelf ingeniouſly oppos'd, or elſe have been convinc'd by him: Whereas now I appear ignorant where I am not ſo, and Mr. *Clark* by no means advantageouſly, when he gives himſelf the trouble to diſpute with a Man in Print, that he makes ignorant of the firſt Rudiments of Natural Philoſophy.

2. Mr. *Clark* ſays, *That the Powers in a Roſe are nothing elſe but a number of ſimilar Motions or Figures*; wherein there are two things to be prov'd: (1.) That the mere Figure and Motion of the Parts of a Roſe do produce, or are the ſole external Cauſe of the Senſation caus'd by them. (2.) That thoſe Motions and Figures are perfectly ſimilar.

3. Mr. *Clark* ſays, *That Gravitation is the Effect of the continu'd and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter*: whereas it does not appear but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally plac'd in it by God, and is now left to it ſelf to act by thoſe Original Powers. And it is as conceivable that Matter ſhould act by virtue of thoſe Powers, as that an Immaterial Being ſhould originally put it into motion, or continue it in motion. P. 13.

Sect. 2. It was objected, " Since it is " only requir'd that a thing be an Indivi- " dual Being, in order to its being a pro- " per Subject of a power of Thinking, or " at leaſt that it may be poſſible for God " to ſuperadd to it a power of Thinking; " it is evident by Mr. *Clark*'s own account " of Matter, which he makes to conſiſt " of *actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts* " (tho I wonder at the ſame time he ſhould " make it *diviſible*, when by its conſiſting " of ſeparate and diſtinct Parts it is actu- " ally divided) that thoſe *ſeparate and diſ- " tinct Parts* are capable of having a power " of Thinking, or an individual Conſci- " ouſneſs ſuperadded to each of them; " becauſe the want of Individuality or " Diſtinctneſs is the ſole reaſon urg'd why " a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a power " of Thinking, or an individual Conſci- " ouſneſs: and conſequently, according " to Mr. *Clark*'s own Reaſoning, Matter " may have a power of Thinking, or an " Individual Conſciouſneſs." To this Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *That ſuppoſing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual, that is, an indiviſible or indiſcerpible Being; yet it would not therefore follow that it could be capable of Thinking: for tho Diviſibility or Diſcerpibility in any Subject is a ſufficient proof that that Subject is not capable of ſuch an Individual Power as Thinking; yet it*

does

does not from thence follow on the contrary, that whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking.

1*ſt*. But if Indiſcerpibility be what is only requir'd in Mr. *Clark*'s Argument for a Subject of a power of Thinking, then it muſt follow, not only that what is diſcerpible cannot think, but that whatever is indiſcerpible is capable of Thinking, till Mr. *Clark* thinks fit to add ſuch Conſiderations to his *Argument*, whereby an individual material Being is excluded from a capacity of Thinking, and an individual immaterial Being is not: For if Indiſcerpibility is all that is mention'd as requiſite in a Subject for a power of Thinking, then wherever there is Indiſcerpibility, there is all that is requir'd by that Argument. And ſo tho it does not, from *Diſcerpibility in any Subject's being a ſufficient proof that that Subject is not capable of Thinking*, univerſally follow, *that whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking*; yet it may and does follow from Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, as it ſtands at preſent, and I deſire him to ſhew me any one Principle, in the preſent Argument, from whence it cannot be as well infer'd, that an Individual Material Being is a proper Subject of a power of Thinking, as an Immaterial Being.

But Mr. *Clark* ſays, *Tho the want of Individuality or Diſtinctneſs is the ſole reaſon urg'd*

urg'd in the preſent Argument, why a Syſtem of Matter cannot think; yet it ought not therefore to be ſaid, that it is only requir'd that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a power of Thinking. Upon which I obſerve, that Mr. *Clark* owns the Truth of my reaſoning upon the ſuppoſition, that Individuality is only requir'd by him in a Subject of a power of Thinking; but denys that I have any reaſon to infer that Individuality is only requir'd *from the want of Individuality's being the ſole reaſon urg'd why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a power of Thinking:* which I cannot help thinking to be all one, till there is a Difference aſſign'd between *only requir'd* in the preſent Argument, and *the ſole reaſon urg'd* in the preſent Argument.

(2.) Had I affirm'd, from the Conſideration of Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, *That whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking*; I cannot ſee how Mr. *Clark*, conſiſtently with the Principles on which his Argument proceeds, can urge any Conſiderations, whereby an Individual Material Being is excluded from a capacity of Thinking: and if he cannot, then it follows univerſally from his Argument, that whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. This I would ſhow,

P. 18. but that Mr. *Clark* does *deny the Suppoſition on which this Objection is grounded,* viz. *that*

that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Indiſcerpible Being: and therefore I ſhall ſpare the Reader, by not arguing longer on a Suppoſition deny'd on both ſides; tho when I urg'd it, I took it to be Mr. *Clark*'s Opinion, becauſe he ſaid, *Matter conſiſted of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts:* by which words ſince he underſtands improper Parts, or Parts that ſeem ſo to us (for according to him Matter has no Parts) I own the ground of my Objection, as founded on his words, is intirely taken away.

Sect. 3. It was objected, " Suppoſing " Mr. *Clark* had prov'd, that Conſciouſ- " neſs could only reſide in an Individual " Being, and that an Individual Being " muſt be an Immaterial Being, the Soul " would not then be prov'd naturally Im- " mortal, and conſequently all the pains " taken to prove the Soul Immaterial ſig- " nify nothing. Nothing is prov'd natu- " rally Immortal by the ſuppoſition of the " Soul's Immateriality, but the Subſtance " of the Soul. Now the Soul is ſuppos'd " to be a Thinking Immaterial Being; " and unleſs a Thinking Immaterial Be- " ing can be prov'd naturally Immortal, " the Soul cannot be prov'd naturally Im- " mortal. But how this can be done, I " know not, but by ſhowing the inſepa- " rable Connexion between Immaterial " Being and Thinking; and till then we

" have

" have as much reaſon to believe that
" Thinking is an Action which may com-
" mence after the Exiſtence of its Subject,
" and may periſh or ceaſe to exiſt, its Sub-
" ject ſtill remaining. And thus there is
" no more progreſs made in the proof of
" the natural Immortality of the Soul,
" by proving its Immateriality, than there
" would be in proving the natural Im-
" mortality of Mens Bodys which are laid
" in the Graves, by ſhowing that Matter
" can only periſh by Annihilation: for, as
" in the laſt Caſe, no proof is made of the
" neceſſary continuance together of the
" ſeveral Particles that compoſe our Bo-
" dys; ſo, in the other Caſe, we have no
" proof that Thinking is an inſeparable
" Property of Immaterial Being. Of what
" uſe then is this Argument to the ends
" and purpoſes of Religion? for if we
" have no ſecurity that we muſt exiſt here-
" after in a ſtate of Perception, as by only
" proving the natural Immortality of the
" Soul we have not, it can be of no uſe to
" influence our Lives and Actions.

P. 21. To this Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *That all the Qualitys and Modes of an Indiſcerpible Being are utterly incapable of being affected in any degree by any Power in Nature; for all real and inherent Qualitys, of any Subſtance, are either Modifications of the Subſtance it ſelf, or elſe Powers ſuperadded and connected to*

the

the Subſtance by the immediate Power of God: And, in either of theſe Caſes, 'tis manifeſt no Quality can be alter'd by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make ſome alteration in the Subſtance (in the Diſpoſition of the Parts at leaſt) it ſelf, which in an Indiſcerpible Subſtance cannot be done.

1. Upon this Anſwer I obſerve, That it is inconſiſtent with matter of fact, or elſe ſuppoſes the Soul a Material Being: For we know by experience, that the Soul or Thinking Being undergoes ſeveral Changes or Alterations. It has not only different Paſſions, as Anger, Love, *&c.* at different times, which are Modifications of the Soul, that begin and have their period, but has Qualitys or Powers, ſuch as Seeing and Hearing, which by the defect of our Organs plainly ceaſe for a time. Now when Mr. *Clark* reconciles our having different Paſſions at different times, and our enjoying of Powers, and then loſing of them, with his Notion, *That all the Qualitys and Modes of an Indiſcerpible Being are utterly incapable of being affected in any meaſure, or chang'd in any degree by any Power of Nature*; I promiſe him to account for the poſſibility of Thinking's ceaſing in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature. But if he cannot, what remains, but from the Actions of our Souls which muſt then, according to him, be inconſiſtent with their

their Exiſtence in an Indiſcerpible Being, to conclude the Soul to be material?

2. *The Powers of Nature* ſignify material and finite immaterial Beings, and their ſeveral Powers and Operations one on another. Now till Mr. *Clark* has a compleat Idea of both ſorts of Beings, their Powers and Operations one on another, it is impoſſible for him in many reſpects to tell how far they can affect one another's Operations: For inſtance, there are Beings in the World that think, of whoſe Subſtance I have no other Idea but that it is indiſcerpible by the Powers of Nature; but yet I underſtand not the manner how theſe indiſcerpible Beings think, nor how they are capable of other Qualitys, nor what other Qualitys and Powers they have. Nor do I underſtand all the Powers of material or other immaterial Beings, and the manner of their Operations; how then can I poſſibly tell how that of which I have no Idea may affect an Action or Power of another Being of which I have no Idea, how it is perform'd, how it inheres in its Subject, or wherein the nature of that Power conſiſts?

3. But Mr. *Clark* ſays, *No Quality or Mode can be alter'd by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make ſome alteration of the Subſtance it ſelf; which in an Inaiſcerpible Subſtance cannot be done.* In anſwer

anſwer to which I ask Mr. *Clark*, whether God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, without making ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf? If Mr. *Clark* replys, That God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality, without making ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf; then there is no repugnancy in the nature of the thing, that a Mode or Quality may be deſtroy'd, without any alteration of the Parts of that Subſtance which was the Subject of that Mode or Quality. If he ſays, That God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality in an immaterial Subſtance, without making any alteration in the Subſtance, but that a created Being by any Powers that it is capable of receiving from the hand of God cannot; I deſire him to give me any Argument upon his Principles to prove created Beings cannot, that will not equally conclude againſt God's deſtroying ſuch a Power, unleſs at the ſame time he annihilates the Subject of that Power. He cannot make it impoſſible for the Powers of an Immaterial Being to ceaſe, by the Operations of created Beings on it, from its Indiſcerpibility, without excluding God from putting an end merely to thoſe Powers; for, according to Mr. *Clark*, God himſelf can no more make any alteration in the Parts of an immaterial Subſtance, than a created Being can. If Mr. *Clark* replys, That God cannot

not deſtroy a Mode or Quality of an immaterial Being, without making an alteration in the Parts of the Subſtance: I anſwer, that if God does make any alteration in the Parts of the Subſtance, upon deſtroying the Power or Quality that he has ſuperadded; then an immaterial Subſtance is plainly as diſcerpible by the Power of God as a material Subſtance: and all Mr. *Clark*'s Arguments againſt the poſſibility of Matter's thinking, turn upon him; for alteration of Parts in a finite Being is as much an Evidence of Diſcerpibility, as Solidity is. But, laſtly, if Mr. *Clark* replys, That no Power or Quality can be deſtroy'd, without the annihilation of the Subject of that Power, I deſire a reaſon may be given why God can *ſuperadd a Power* to an immaterial Being, as Mr. *Clark* acknowledges he can, and not cauſe it to ceaſe, its Subject remaining as it was before the Power was ſuperadded.

P. 21.

4. But to give him all the Satisfaction I can, I ſhall inſtance in a Quality of immaterial Being, that may owe its continuance to the Actions of created Beings, and may ceaſe without making any alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf. Extenſion not being excluded out of Mr. *Clark*'s Idea of Immaterial Being, it is plain, whenever our Bodys are carry'd from one place to another, our Souls muſt likewiſe move along with 'em; tho

tho Motion is no doubt incompatible with Immaterial Being, in caſe Immaterial Being has no Extenſion. Now this ſuppos'd Motion of our Souls is intirely owing to external and material Cauſes, not only as to the degree of Motion, but as to the determination of the Motion; for both the degree of Motion, and the particular determination thereof will ceaſe upon withdrawing the external material Cauſes: and if any particular Motion of an Immaterial Being be owing to external material Cauſes, then all its Motions, for all we know to the contrary, may be ſo too; and if ſo, there can be no repugnancy, in ſuppoſing it poſſible for an Immaterial Being to be deſtitute of the Quality of actual Motion. And if there is no repugnancy in ſuppoſing, that Motion may be continu'd in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature, and may ceaſe by withdrawing of thoſe Powers; then Mr. *Clark's* Affirmation, *That no Quality of an Immaterial Being can be alter'd by any natural Power, which is not able to make an Alteration (in the Diſpoſition of the Parts at leaſt) of the Subſtance it ſelf*, is very precarious.

5. Laſtly, Suppoſing Mr. *Clark* had prov'd in this Article, what I conceive he has not, That the whole Soul, the Thinking Immaterial Being, is indiviſible by the Powers of Nature, or naturally immortal in that ſenſe, yet this Indiviſibility,

this Natural Immortality, is no more than he allows to ſome Particles of Matter;
P. 22, 23. for he ſays, *That there are original, and perfectly ſolid Particles, which are to any Power of Nature indiſcerpible:* and he cor-
P. 18. rects me for calling any Particle of Matter an *Individual Being*, becauſe it cannot be divided by natural Cauſes, or the Powers of Nature: and therefore if a Particle of Matter, notwithſtanding its Indiſcerpibility by natural Cauſes, is not naturally immortal, or indiviſible in that ſenſe, in which Mr. *Clark* requires the Subſtance of the Soul to be, *viz.* to be indiſcerpible by the Power of God, neither can the whole thinking Being be prov'd naturally immortal in that ſenſe, unleſs it can be ſhow'd, that the whole thinking Being is indiſcerpible by the Power of God. But to that Queſtion he has not ſaid any thing, and therefore I may conclude, that ſuppoſing *Thinking* muſt reſide in an individual Being, or a Being that is indiſcerpible by the Power of God, yet it does not follow, that the thinking immaterial Being is indiſcerpible by the Power of God, or naturally immortal.

It was objected, 4. " Since an indivi-
" dual Being can only be the ſubject of a
" Power of thinking, Why may not ſe-
" veral Particles of Matter, when united
" in one Syſtem, become an individual
" Being, and be by the Power of God
" render'd

" render'd incapable of any Diviſion or
" Separation by natural Cauſes, and con-
" ſequently be a ſubject capable of think-
" ing? If ſeveral Particles of Matter can
" be ſo united as to touch one another,
" or cloſely adhere; wherein does the
" Diſtinctneſs or Individuality of the ſe-
" veral Particles conſiſt? The Diſtinctneſs
" or Individuality is as much loſt to me
" by this ſuppos'd Union, as the Diſtinct-
" neſs of the Parts of an immaterial Be-
" ing, upon ſuppoſition that Extenſion is
" not excluded out of the Idea of Imma-
" teriality, as it is not by Mr. *Clark*, if I
" rightly apprehend him: For if the U-
" nion of material Particles be compleat
" and intire, I can as well conceive an im-
" material Being capable of Diviſion, as
" conceive thoſe Particles ſo united, capa-
" ble of Diviſion from one another. All
" the Difference perceivable by us, be-
" tween ſuch a material Subſtance, be-
" ſides Solidity in one and want of Soli-
" dity in the other, lies in this, That one
" perhaps continues as it was created, and
" the other becomes by the Power of
" God what the other was by Creation.
" And what difference that will make as
" to one's being capable of the Power of
" thinking, and the other's not being ca-
" pable of that Power, does not appear to
" me, and never will till Thinking and

" Solidity are prov'd to be incompatible
" in the ſame Subject.

P. 23, 24. To this Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *That the Caſe is very different*, between ſuch a Material Being and an Immaterial Being, tho it be ſuppos'd to be extended, *becauſe ſome of the firſt and moſt obvious Properties, which we certainly know of Matter, as its having* partes extra partes, *ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, and its conſiſting of ſuch Parts as can exiſt ſeparately, and have no Dependence on one another, do neceſſarily and confeſſedly imply Diſcerpibility: But in Immaterial Beings we do not know of any ſuch Propertys as any wiſe imply Diſcerpibility.*

The Caſe is not different between ſuch a Material Being as I have deſcrib'd, and a finite extended Immaterial Being: for tho all Matter does conſiſt of Parts, that have no dependance on one another for their Exiſtence; yet by the Suppoſition in the Objection, it is as indiſcerpible by natural Cauſes as an Immaterial Being. Now this Suppoſition Mr. *Clark* is ſo far from denying to be poſſible, that he grants

P. 22. it to be true in fact, *That there are Particles of Matter which are to any Powers in Nature indiſcerpible.* And if there are or may be Syſtems of Matter, which imply Indiſcerpibility by natural Cauſes, tho they are allow'd diſcerpible by the Power of God, there can be no difference between thoſe Syſtems of Matter, and any

 other

other finite extended Beings, as to their Diviſibility by the Powers of Nature. Nor can there be any difference as to their Diviſibility by the Power of God, for all finite extended Beings muſt ſo far conſiſt of Parts, that the Part of one ſide is not the Part of the other ſide. They can only conſiſt in a Continuity of the ſame Subſtance: and why ſuch a Subſtance ſhould not be as diviſible as a perfectly continu'd ſolid Subſtance, I can ſee no reaſon. Let Mr. *Clark* ſhow that a continu'd ſolid Subſtance is diſcerpible by the Power of God, and the ſame Argument will equally ſhow the Diſcerpibility of any other finite continu'd Subſtance. Suppoſe the Subſtance of the Soul to be four Inches ſquare (for when once Extenſion is allow'd to the Soul, ſuch a Suppoſition becomes reaſonable) I ask Mr. *Clark*, If that Subſtance at its Creation did not depend entirely on the Will of God as to the Degree of its Extenſion, as much as any of thoſe perfectly ſolid Particles of Matter did, which are allow'd to be indiſcerpible by the Powers of Nature? and whether God could not have made it two Inches ſquare, had he pleas'd, as well as any of thoſe Particles ſmaller? Both which, I ſuppoſe, Mr. *Clark* will allow. Then I ask him, If God can make Immaterial Beings of different Dimenſions, what can hinder him from

making an Immaterial Being leſs than when he firſt created it, that will not hinder him from making a *continu'd* ſolid Being leſs than when he firſt created that? It does not appear to me, that an Inch on one ſide of an Immaterial Being is more dependent on an Inch on the other ſide, as to each other's Exiſtence, than two ſides of a perfectly ſolid Particle of Matter are. So that I think we have as clear Evidence, *we do as much know* of a Property in Immaterial Subſtance, which implys Diſcerpibility, as we do in ſome Particles of Matter; continu'd Extenſion in a Being as much implying Diſcerpibility, as continu'd Solidity. But Mr. *Clark* ſays, *As the known parts of Space can demonſtrably be prov'd to be abſolutely indiſcerpible; ſo it ought not to be reckon'd an inſuperable Difficulty, to imagine extended Immaterial Subſtance may be ſo likewiſe.* Tho the known Parts of Space can be demonſtrated to be abſolutely indiſcerpible; yet it may be, and is an inſuperable Difficulty to imagine an Immaterial Subſtance may be ſo likewiſe, becauſe Space is infinitely extended, and becauſe it is nothing but the mere Abſence or Place of Bodys; whereas Immaterial Being is ſomething extended and finite. Now if all finite extended Beings are diviſible by the Power of God, then all Mr. *Clark* ſays againſt Matter's thinking has equal Force

(if

(if it has any at all) againſt an Immaterial Being's thinking, as will appear by his own Words, if we put immaterial or extended Being in the place of the term Matter or material Being. *Suppoſe*, ſays he, *an Extended Being as ſmall as you* P. 18, 19. *pleaſe, indu'd with Conſciouſneſs or Thought; yet if by the Power of God this* Extended Being *may be divided into two parts, what will naturally and conſequently become of its Power of Thinking? If that Power continue in it unchang'd; then there muſt be two diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes in the two ſeparate parts; or elſe the Power continuing in the intermediate Diſtance or Space, as well as in the Parts themſelves, muſt there ſubſiſt without a Subject; or elſe not the material Subſtance, but ſome other thing is the Subject of the Conſciouſneſs. If the Power of thinking will remain only in one of the ſeparated Parts; then either that one Part only had at firſt the Power reſiding in it, and then the ſame Queſtion will return upon the Suppoſition of its being likewiſe divided; or elſe it will follow that one and the ſame Individual Quality may be transfer'd from one Subject to another, which all Philoſophers of all Sects in the World have always confeſt to be impoſſible. If in the laſt place it be ſaid, that upon the Diviſion of an* Extended Being, *the Power of thinking which was in it will wholly ceaſe; then it will follow, that that was never or at all a real*

Quality inhering and reſiding in the Subſtance (in which mere Separation of Parts makes no Alteration) but that it was a mere external Denomination, as the Roundneſs of a Being which periſhes at its being divided: And this he ſuppoſes *will be granted to be ſufficiently abſurd.*

It was objected, in the fifth and laſt place. " But let us ſuppoſe, that from " the Power of thinking or Individual " Conſciouſneſs, we can prove the Immaterial" ity of the Soul, and from its Immaterial" ity prove its natural Immortality, " and then ſee what will be the Conſe" quence. All the numerous ſenſible Crea" tures in the Univerſe are put in the ſame " Condition with Man, and made capable " of Eternal Happineſs as well as he. " Now to avoid this Conſequence there " are two things principally urg'd.

" 1. That all thoſe Creatures (which I " call ſenſible) are only mere Machines; or,

" 2. That their Souls ſhall be annihila" ted with their Bodies.

" To the firſt I anſwer, That Expe" rience as much convinces us, that they " perceive, think, *&c.* as that Men do: " They avoid Pain and ſeek Pleaſure, and " give as good marks of Uneaſineſs under " the one and Satisfaction under the other, " as Men do; they avoid Pain, and ſeek " Pleaſure by the ſame Motives that Men " do, *viz.* by reflecting on their paſt

" Actions,

" Actions, and the Actions of their Fel-
" lows, with the Conſequences of them;
" which is evident from their acting more
" to their own Advantage, the more Ex-
" perience they have had. But if after all
" Brutes are only mere Machines, the dif-
" ficulty of proving the Soul immaterial
" will be increas'd: for if the Operations
" of Brutes are not ſufficient to diſtinguiſh
" them from Clocks and Watches, the
" Operations of Men will not prove *them*
" to be ſuperior to Machines.

" To the ſecond Objection I anſwer,
" That if the Souls of Brutes are annihi-
" lated on the Diſſolution of their Bodys,
" then the proof of the natural Immorta-
" lity of Mens Souls from their Imma-
" teriality, tends not to prove that their
" Souls really be Immortal, becauſe mere
" natural Immortality is not a Security
" from Annihilation, as is ſuppos'd in the
" Objection.

To which Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *That tho* P. 26.
ſenſible Creatures have certainly ſomething in them that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they muſt needs be annihilated upon the Diſſolution of their Bodys, or elſe be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man. This is juſt ſuch an Argument as if a Man ſhould conclude, that whatſoever is not exactly like himſelf, can therefore have no Being at all. The ſtrength of this Anſwer lies in my ſuppoſing either a neceſſity of

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Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the Diſſolution of their Bodys, or elſe that they become capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man; which ſhould I allow to be what I intended, yet it would not be *juſt ſuch an Argument as if a Man ſhould conclude, that whatſoever is not exactly like himſelf can therefore have no Being at all*; becauſe it does not place an Oppoſition between a capacity of the Soul's Eternal Happineſs, and not exiſting at all, but between a capacity of Eternal Happineſs, and not exiſting after the Diſſolution of their Bodys. And therefore tho it may follow from the Argument, that whatever Immaterial Being has not a capacity of Eternal Happineſs cannot exiſt after the Diſſolution of the Body to which it was join'd; yet it by no means follows, That no Immaterial Being or Soul can exiſt at all, unleſs it has a capacity of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man; or, in Mr. *Clark*'s words, *is not exactly like himſelf* as to that capacity. But it was very far from my Intention to argue, that there was either a neceſſity of the Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the Diſſolution of their Bodys, or elſe that they would be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man; but only to argue either the neceſſity of Annihilation ſome time or other, or elſe that Brutes would be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man. For when I objected to my ſelf,

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That the Souls of Brutes ſhall be annihilated with the Diſſolution of their Bodys, I conſider'd, that thoſe who would ſuppoſe an Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes, would be moſt likely to pitch on the Diſſolution of the Body as the proper Term or Period for the Exiſtence of their Souls, as I could ſhow from the ſeveral Anſwerers of Mr. *Dodwell*; who only from his ſuppoſing the Soul to be naturally mortal, tho capable of Immortality, conclude the time of the Diſſolution of the Body the proper time for the actual Mortality of the Soul. And therefore I crave leave to underſtand Mr. *Clark*'s Argument after this manner, *That tho all ſenſible Creatures have certainly in them ſomething that is Immaterial; yet it does not at all follow either that they muſt needs be annihilated, or elſe that they muſt be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man.* To which I reply, That ſince Mr. *Clark* does allow, that all the ſenſible Creatures in the Univerſe are not mere Machines, by acknowledging *that they have all ſomething in them that is Immaterial*, I deſire him to tell me, conſiſtently with the Principles of his foregoing Argument for the natural Immortality of the thinking Immaterial Being in us, what elſe remains reaſonable, but that they be ſuppos'd ſometime or other to be annihilated, or elſe be ſuppos'd capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man: for they having ſomething

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Immaterial in them, muſt, according to Mr. *Clark*, for ever, without Annihilation, enjoy the Power of Perception; and if they muſt have for ever a Power of Perception, they muſt have either agreeable or diſagreeable Perceptions; and if they muſt have either agreeable or diſagreeable Perceptions, they muſt be ſuppos'd capable of eternal agreeable Perceptions, unleſs Mr. *Clark* will ſay, that they are only capable of an eternal Mixture of agreeable and diſagreeable Perceptions, or only capable of eternal diſagreeable Perceptions: which, ſince they are unreaſonable Suppoſitions, and would deſtroy all proof of Man's Capacity for a happy Immortality from the Argument now in queſtion, I dare ſay he will not affirm.

My laſt Objection therefore clear'd from all doubtfulneſs ariſing from Expreſſion, and to which I ſhould be glad to receive a good Anſwer, ſtands thus, That if from the Power of Thinking we can prove the Immateriality of the Soul of Man, and from its Immateriality prove its natural Immortality, and conſequently its Capacity of Eternal Happineſs; the Power of Thinking muſt prove the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, the Immateriality of their Souls muſt prove their natural Immortality, and conſequently their Capacity of Eternal Happineſs. If it be ſuppos'd that the Souls of Brutes may be ſometime

or

or other annihilated, then this Argument is not uſeful to the end for which it is intended; becauſe natural Immortality will then be no proof of the real Immortality of the Soul of Man.

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the finiſhing this Reply to Mr. *Clark*, I have met with Mr. *Milles*'s Anſwer to Mr. *Dodwell*'s *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*; in the Preface whereof he has endeavour'd to defend Mr. *Clark's Argument for the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul* againſt my Objections, but upon Principles which intirely overthrow it, and by putting ſuch a ſenſe on Mr. *Clark*'s words as is inconſiſtent with what Mr. *Clark* underſtands by them in his *Defence*. As for inſtance, Mr. *Milles* ſays, *If that which thinks within us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts*; and *that by Individual Being, in Mr.* Clark's *reaſoning, we are to underſtand an unextended Being:* And again, *That I did not rightly apprehend Mr.* Clark, *when I ſaid Extenſion was not excluded by him out of his Idea of Immateriality.* Whereas Mr. *Clark* is ſo far from objecting any ſuch miſtake to me, and from ſuppoſing, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts*, that in the fourth Article of his *Defence* he argues with me as not miſtaking his meaning, by allowing

Pref. p. 6. P. 7. P. 10.

allowing *Extenſion not to be excluded out of his Idea of Immateriality*, and gives up his Argument, in caſe I prove that whatever is finitely extended muſt conſiſt of Parts; that is, prove what Mr. *Milles* grants to be true, and inſiſts on in defence of Mr. *Clark*. Therefore inſtead of returning any particular Anſwer to Mr. *Milles*'s Obſervations, I refer him for ſatisfaction to Mr. *Clark*'s *Defence*, where he may not only ſee that he has miſtaken Mr. *Clark*'s meaning, but that Mr. *Clark*'s Argument cannot be defended by him till he retracts his *Preface:* for if an Immaterial Being or Soul be, according to Mr. *Clark*, an extended Being, and yet indiſcerpible both by the Powers of Nature and the Power of God, then Mr. *Milles*'s Aſſertion, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts, and that it is impoſſible that what has Parts ſhould be the Subject of Thought*, do overthrow Mr. *Clark*'s demonſtration of the Immateriality of the Soul; for if whatever is extended muſt conſiſt of Parts, and if that which conſiſts of Parts cannot think, then Mr. *Clark*'s Immaterial Being cannot think, and conſequently the Immateriality of the Soul, in Mr. *Clark*'s ſenſe, is deſtroy'd by Mr. *Milles*'s Defence: and therefore if Mr. *Milles* undertakes again Mr. *Clark*'s Defence, he muſt firſt retract this Principle in his Preface, *That if that which thinks in us*

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be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts, before he can demonſtaate the Indiſcerpibility of an extended Being; that is, before he can prove the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul, in Mr. *Clark*'s ſenſe.

Tho Mr. *Milles* has thus egregiouſly miſtaken Mr. *Clark*, yet it is but juſt to let the Reader ſee the reaſon he aſſigns why Mr. *Clark* muſt underſtand by Immaterial Being, Unextended Being. *The Remarker*, ſays he, *has done Mr.* Clark *a great deal of wrong in ſaying he does not exclude Extenſion out of the Idea of Immateriality; ſince it is plain our Argument would have no force, but upon ſuppoſition that the immaterial thinking Subſtance within us is prov'd not to be extended.* For which Argument I ſhall not return him the Civility he beſtows on me, in *ſuppoſing that I deſpiſe Logick*, but take the liberty to attribute it to a more indiſputable Cauſe, notwithſtanding he has the modeſty to ſay, *He has taken the liberty to imitate the great Mr.* Chillingworth *throughout his Treatiſe.* P. 10. P. 16. P. 22.

As Mr. *Milles* does not ſufficiently agree with Mr. *Clark* in Principles, in order to defend him; ſo Mr. *Milles* and I are not ſufficiently agreed in common Principles to diſpute with one another. In a matter of Speculation it is not the Authority of *Tully* himſelf, could his Opinions be known (I ſay could they be known, becauſe he does not always tell us on what ſide he is

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in his Philoſophical Dialogues) nor all the Philoſophers that ever liv'd, much leſs the Fathers of the Church, that has any weight with me. It is Reaſon alone, from what hand ſoever it comes, to which I am ready to pay my Submiſſion, and it is by that alone that Mr. *Clark* and I propoſe to be determin'd: and therefore when Mr. *Milles* urges no other Argument to prove the Power of Thinking inſeparable from Immaterial Being, but by ſaying,

P. 16, 17. *The Power of Thinking has been always look'd upon, and is now by every one acknowledg'd to be a neceſſary Property of Immateriality*;

I think it fruitleſs to contend with a Man who knows not that the Queſtion between Mr. *Clark* and me is not a Queſtion that depends on the Opinion of any Man, nor that Mr. *Clark* propos'd only by the *Argument* I have examin'd to demonſtrate the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul by Reaſon. In ſhort, his arguing from Fact is as foreign to the matter, as if I ſhould uſe ſome topical Arguments to prove the Fathers profound Philoſophers, when that Queſtion can only be determin'd by an Induction of particular Paſſages out of their Works, to which end Mr. *Milles*'s and Mr. *Dodwell*'s Writings may perhaps be allow'd very uſeful.

F I N I S.